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

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MAN in queſt of HIMSELF:

OR, A

DEFENCE

OF THE

INDIVIDUALITY

OF THE

HUMAN MIND, or SELF.

Occaſioned by

Some REMARKS in the MONTHLY REVIEW for *July* 1763. on a Note in SEARCH's FREEWILL.

By CUTHBERT COMMENT, Gent.

They imagine Compounds to be ſomewhat really different from that of which they are compounded; which is a very great miſtake.

Clarke, Attrib. 6th *Edit.* 1725. *page* 53.

Endleſly ſeparable parts are as really diſtinct Beings, notwithſtanding their contiguity, as if they had been at never ſo great a diſtance from one another.

Ibid. p. 89.

LONDON:

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BRITISH MUSEUM

MAN in queſt of Himſelf.

IT is an old obſervation, that nothing is more difficult for a Man to know than himſelf; inſomuch that this ſcience was thought unattainable without ſupernatural aſſiſtance; for

From Heaven's high dome deſcended, KNOW THYSELF.

But then this was underſtood to reſpect the knowledge of a Man's character, ſentiments, and real motives of action; nor was it ever eſteemed difficult to know his own perſon from that of another, or from his cloaths, his hair, or any thing elſe belonging to him. Whereas a difficulty has been lately ſtarted in aſcertaining what is properly *the Man*, or to what the pronoun *I* ought to be applied.

The laſt *Monthly Review* for *July* 1763. has made honourable mention of my Couſin and

myſelf, and has interſperſed therein ſome criticiſms, by way of admonition for our conduct: He may ſee they are not loſt upon us; for we have profited by them already in our title-page. We had proceeded before upon *Horace*'s antiquated rule, being ſtudious rather of producing fire out of ſmoke, than ſmoke out of a flaſh; never reflecting, that ſince the invention of gunpowder it is manifeſt the gun can never do execution if the pan do not flaſh. So to pleaſe him, I have put a little more powder into the pan this time of charging: and we hope he perceives by the look of the flaſh, that our ſhot is not levelled againſt him, but againſt an opinion he has advanced. For theſe two are very different marks: people may differ in ſentiment upon a ſpeculative point, and ſtill be very good friends. And indeed he has ſaid ſo many obliging things of us, far beyond our moſt ſanguine expectation, that it would be the height of imprudence to put him out of humour with us, or attempt to leſſen his character: we rather wiſh his authority may be ſo great with the public, as that they may give their voices upon us according to his ſumming up the evidence; we ſhall be perfectly ſatisfied with the verdict.

Yet

Yet we ſhall obſerve in paſſing, that beſides his admonitions, he has been careful to inſtruct us by his example too; for, though he has allowed my Author to have acquitted himſelf with politeneſs, yet it ſeems this was not a politeneſs of the right faſhionable colour, admired in our great Metropolis and the adjacent Borough; therefore he has ſet us a pattern of the true genuine ſort in the following expreſſions: *Greatly deficient in phyſiological knowledge*;—*Very conſiderable blunders*;—*Theſe very accurate philologiſts*;—*Indeed, friend, you have here overlooked yourſelf*;—*It is with equal impropriety they talk.*——Now, we muſt needs acknowledge theſe ſtrains in the higheſt pitch of modern perfection, becauſe the like abound in the *North Briton* and *Cave of Famine*, thoſe celebrated performances, which every true-born Engliſhman doats upon. But we are much afraid whether we ſhall be able to copy after his example; for it is commonly obſerved, that nobody ever ſucceeds in a thing he does not give his mind to; but it happens unluckily that we find in ourſelves no inclination to attain this modern genteelneſs: our ambition prompts us rather to the *Ridiculum* than the *Acre*, and we ſhould be proud if wecould acquire a ſpark of that old-faſhioned

ed politeneſs deſcribed by *Perſius* in one of his predeceſſors:

When Horace *every foible touch'd with art,*
His ſmiling friend receiv'd him to his heart,
Pleas'd with the tickling probe, nor felt it ſmart.
The teſty people too could patient ſtand,
While wip'd their follies by his ſkilful hand.

I don't know why he ſhould take ſuch diſtaſte at my button, unleſs perhaps that he ſaw his own face in one part of it; and might be a little chagrined to find, that I had not better maintained the dignity of the noble branch of the *Comments:*

However, I have the pleaſure to ſee this little diſappointment has not overcome his affection to a relation; for he has ſpoken of me in a very handſome manner, well becoming one *Comment* of another: and with reſpect to my Author, whom he will eaſily believe I muſt love as well as I do myſelf, he has proceeded with remarkable tenderneſs. For it being abſolutely neceſſary to find fault ſomewhere, becauſe the Public, proceeding for once upon a very right principle, That there can be no perſon nor performance in this world compleatly perfect, would not think him well

qualified

qualified for his office of Critic-General, if he did not find ſomething to blame in every piece he took in hand; he has kindly ſpared the main work, and fallen upon one of my Notes, containing a matter no ways affecting the argument carried on in the text.

But notwithſtanding his good intention, ſo it happens, that he has done us more miſchief than we flatter ourſelves he deſigned. For the Individuality of the Mind was a principle Mr. *Search* had depended upon to prove its unperiſhableneſs; which gave an opening to his enquiries concerning the other world. Becauſe his plan having confined him to build ſolely upon the fund of natural reaſon, he was not entitled to avail himſelf of the aſſurances given in the Goſpel: but while it remained uncertain whether our continuance was to laſt any longer than this life, there was very little encouragement to conſider whether there were another world or no: on the other hand, if it could be ſhown from contemplation of our Nature, that the Mind is built to laſt for ever, then it would become expedient to examine what is likely to befal her hereafter, and whether any thing to be done at preſent may affect her future condition.

Therefore

Therefore my couſin exhorted me to endeavour ſettling what is a Man's Self, and whether it may have continuance after diſſolution of the human frame: not in contradiction to Mr. *Monthly*, with whom we have no quarrel, but in defence of an article we conceive material, againſt whoever ſhall attack it, or as a further explanation to ſuch as may not have fully comprehended our meaning.

But we muſt crave leave to make our defence in our own way: and as *Horace* obſerves that every animal places his dependence upon the arms Nature has furniſhed him with, the Wolf never defends himſelf with his heels, nor the Bull with his teeth: ſo we, who it ſeems are excellent Philologiſts, though greatly deficient in phyſiological knowledge, and for this reaſon do not clearly comprehend what is to be underſtood by phyſical and metaphyſical exiſtence, palpable and impalpable individuals, material and immaterial ſubſtance, as handled by our opponent, may be allowed to avail ourſelves of that part where our greateſt ſtrength lies.

Therefore, under the guidance of our Patroneſs, who has helped us ſo well hitherto, we ſhall obſerve that *Same* is an equivocal term. If, upon giving me a glaſs of wine, I

ſhould think it taſted different from that you gave me half an hour before, and you aſſure me it is the ſame wine, becauſe you poured it out of the very ſame bottle, I ſhould reſt ſatisfied with the anſwer. But if a conjurer ſhould pretend to take out a glaſs of wine unmingled that I had thrown into water, and upon his producing a glaſs of pure wine I doubted whether it were the ſame, if he ſhould tell me, Yes, for he poured it out of the ſame bottle, I ſhould think he trifled with me.

In like manner it may be ſaid, that rich and poor are all the ſame fleſh and blood, or that every ſtick of elder contains the ſame pithy ſubſtance. Yet whoever ſays this does not imagine, that my cookmaid and I have but one body, or the ſame maſs of blood between us: nor that one ſtick of elder contains the ſame ſubſtance as twenty.

From hence we may ſee there are two ſorts of identity; one wherein things are the ſame in appearance and quality, and this we may call ſpecific: nevertheleſs they ſtill remain numerically diſtinct; as this egg is not the ſame with that, how much ſoever it may be the ſame to the eye, or for any uſes we may have of it.

Thus ſubſtances, as numerically diſtinguiſhed, never fluctuate nor change into one another; their fluctuation is only of form or poſition upon their entering into compoſitions of ſubſtances ſpecifically different. The ſame particles which were mould laſt year, might afterwards have become graſs, then mutton, then human fleſh, laſtly, a flea or a maggot, and continue the ſame throughout all their ſeveral migrations: ſo that what is maggot now, may have been part of a man, or a ſheep, or a blade of graſs, or a clod of dirt.

Therefore if we conſider man as the whole compoſition of fleſh, blood, bones, and humours, it is plain he fluctuates and changes continually: for if he be kept without victuals, his ſubſtance waſtes away, and is renewed again by proper nouriſhment: ſo that how long ſoever he may continue the ſame ſpecies of creature, he does not continue the ſame ſubſtance in all its parts a week nor a day. Nor was the Mr. *Monthly* who dealt ſo favourably with us in *July*, the ſame with him that treated a friend of ours with the like benignity in 1755.

I have met with ſome who ſay they have no idea of ſubſtance, becauſe they cannot conceive one devoid of all quality whatever; but

but this is not the right way of going to work for conceiving it. For there are ſome things we cannot apprehend exiſting by themſelves, tho' we may eaſily in conjunction with others: a father cannot be without a child; there cannot be colour without figure, nor figure without magnitude; yet the ideas of father and ſon, of colour, figure and magnitude, are clearly diſtinct. Nor, if we conſider the matter fairly, is it more eaſy to apprehend quality by itſelf than ſubſtance. For can there be ſquareneſs without ſomething ſquare, or redneſs without any thing red? Or can there be a ſquare or a red nothing, any more than a ſubſtance without quality? But ſquareneſs and redneſs are only perceptions of the mind? What then? Should we ſuppoſe with *Berkeley*, they are not effects of the external cauſes we aſcribe them to, then are there no qualities without us any more than there are ſubſtances: but if there be real qualities producing the perceptions, then is there a real ſomething poſſeſſing the qualities. 'Tis true we may be ſometimes deceived by appearances of things that are not real, as when a man ſees apparitions: but tho' there be no ſubſtance ſtanding before him in the place where he apprehends it to be, yet there is a real ſubſtance

ſomewhere, either in the eye, or the humours, or the brain, cauſing the appearance. Even in the moſt retired thoughts of the mind, whether we imagine her to raiſe thoſe thoughts by her own immediate operation, then is ſhe a ſubſtance poſſeſſing the quality of impreſſing them; or whether ſhe uſes ſome organ of our internal material frame, as an inſtrument to impreſs them by, then is the modification of that organ the object we diſcern.

But the ſtrongeſt idea of ſubſtance we may have from ourſelves, the knowledge whereof is more certain than that of qualities. For how know we the qualities are real, unleſs becauſe we really perceive them? And if we are nothing real ourſelves, they cannot be really perceived by us: for it is the hardeſt thing of all to conceive how any thing unreal can really do or be really affected by any thing. And this ſubſtance retains its exiſtence when exerting no quality, as in ſound ſleep.

Qualities continually change: a ſquare piece of clay may be moulded into a round, warm water may grow cold: but in all theſe changes ſomething ſtill remains the ſame, and that can be none other than the ſubſtance. When a

quality goes off, it is ſucceeded by another, as ſquareneſs in the clay by ſome other figure, and warmth in the water by coolneſs; nor does the ſubſtance ever want a quality to inveſt it: but the quality upon being altered does not fly off to ſome other ſubſtance, but is abſolutely loſt; and may be regained without being drawn from any other fund.

We come next to the term *Individual*; and what does that import but ſomething that cannot be divided? therefore to talk of every Individual being a compound, is a palpable abſurdity, a flat contradiction, the ſame as an indiviſible diviſible, or an uncompounded compound.—Perhaps here our Maſter will think us hopeful lads, beginning to come forward in the modern politeneſs: but we cannot arrogate ſo much merit yet; for we do not charge it upon him as a blunder or impropriety; and for this very good reaſon; becauſe we could not do ſo without hitting ourſelves a ſlap on the face. There were three young fellows once went to ſee a fine garden: one of them ſpying another pluck a peach, whiſpered the third, Pray is it right to take a Gentleman's fruit without leave? Yes, ſays he, it muſt certainly be right; becauſe I have a couple in my pocket. So contradi-

tradictions muſt ſometimes be proper, becauſe Mr. *Search* uſes one in Page 12, where he ſays, " a man may have power when he has " it not." But then we ſee how he brings himſelf off by adding, " That is, he may " have it in one ſenſe while he wants it in " another." Now if we take the ſame method for ſolving the other contradiction, perhaps we ſhall find it throw ſome light upon the argument in hand.

Naturaliſts (I beg pardon, I mean Phyſiologiſts) diſtribute the productions of Nature into kinds, as animals, vegetables, foſſils; which they ſubdivide into Species, as Men, horſes, ſheep, &c. Several further diviſions are occaſionally made under theſe, as French, Engliſh, men grown, children, and the like. But you cannot go lower than the ſingle bodies of each claſs, whoſe parts are joined together, not to be ſeparated without loſing their ſpecific denomination, nor do we ever ſee them reunited after ſeparation. Therefore we call them *Individuals*, becauſe to us they appear ſuch, and may be eſteemed ſuch for any uſes we have of them.

Yet this manner of diſtribution admits of ſeveral exceptions: in ſome ſpecies there are no individuals, ſuch as Fire, Water, Oil; becauſe

cauſe in all diviſions of them diſcernible by our ſenſes, they ſtill retain their ſpecific qualities. Some individuals may be multiplied into many; an oſier may be cut into twenty twigs, each whereof is a diſtinct plant of the ſame kind. Animals and vegetables receive their ſubſtance from parents of their kind, which ſubſtance nevertheleſs loſes its ſpecies during the paſſage, and reſumes it again afterwards: an egg is never numbered in ſpecies with the bird that laid it; but when hatched into a chicken, it ranks as one among the poultry. Both ſpecies and individuals are often made by art: Punch, Beer, and Mead are different kinds of liquor; and when a man takes an inventory of his houſhold goods, he can diſtinguiſh thoſe of the ſame ſort only by individuals; or if he draws off a pipe of wine, he muſt drive in a cork to preſerve each individual bottle from growing vapid. Thus we ſee that both in phyſiological and artificial eſtimation, *Individual* is an arbitrary term, applied to things for our convenience.

With regard to thoſe ſpecies that have individuals, the term Exiſtence or Being muſt belong to them. A Man, being I ſuppoſe a palpable Individual, will be allowed to have an Exiſtence or Being of his own, diſtinct from

from all other men. So you will ſay the whole race of men has a Being and exiſtence of its own, diſtinct from all other creatures. Very true: but not diſtinct from the men compoſing it; nor has it another Being to be added to the number of theirs. The ſame will hold good of any leſſer collection of men; as a Regiment, which has not an additional Being over and above that of the men, nor exiſts otherwiſe than by their exiſtence, which nevertheleſs they have independent on one another. For if Serjeant *Bluff* were annihilated, Corporal *Trim* might ſtill continue the ſame Man he was: but if all the Men were annihilated, what would become of the regiment?

Nevertheleſs it is manifeſt that all theſe individuals, as our Corrector juſtly and properly expreſſes it, are compounds, conſiſting of parts ſubſtantially and numerically diſtinct from each other: ſo that the palpable ſubſtance, *Man*, is a collection of many ſubſtances, as the Regiment was; and has exiſtence no otherwiſe than that; to wit, by the exiſtence of his parts. Were his hands annihilated, his feet might remain the ſame Beings they were before, as *Trim* might upon the deſtruction

of

of *Bluff*; but were all his parts annihilated, the Man muſt utterly loſe his Being.

Well, but his hands and feet are compounds too, made up of the elements: therefore they have no other exiſtence than what belongs to the elements compoſing them. But what ſhall we ſay to theſe elements? for being a meer ignoramus in phyſiological knowledge, I proteſt I don't know what to make of them. I think I can feel earth, water, air, and fire, if they touch me in quantities enough to affect my ſenſes; therefore they ſhould be palpable. But we are told at firſt they are impalpable exiſtencies; and yet I am not ſure of that neither; for it is ſaid afterwards, that if they fluctuate and change into one another, they are no exiſtencies at all, being devoid not only of palpable, but of abſolute and metaphyſical exiſtence, which belongs to nothing beſides God alone.

I ſhall not deny it poſſible the elements may change into one another, but then this is a fluctuation of form, or of eſſence, which ſeems all along to have been miſtaken for exiſtence, not of ſubſtance: for it is impoſſible to conceive any particular ſubſtance ſhould ever change into another ſubſtance, whether ſimilar or of different kind. An egg, by putre-

faction and vegetation, may in proceſs of time become an apple; but this egg can never become that egg, nor that apple; nor can either egg or apple ever loſe their numerical exiſtence, whatever various forms they paſs thro', or new eſſences they take. So if what now is earth once was water, ſtill it is the ſame ſubſtance diverſly modified: nor can this drop of water ever be turned into that drop, or that ſpeck of dirt, by any fluctuation whatever.

But if the elements may change, it muſt be by a various diſpoſition of their parts; therefore they have parts: and I ſuppoſe it is underſtood, tho' not expreſſed, that theſe parts have under parts, and ſo on for ever. Which *ſubintelligitur* is neceſſary to prove the non-exiſtence of elements: for ſince they be compounds, having no other exiſtence than that of their parts, nor theſe than of the under parts compoſing them, we cannot make them a title to exiſtence, until we come to abſolute Individuals without any parts at all, which it is ſuggeſted, are no-where to be found.

Before this was urged againſt us, it ſhould have been remembered what antagoniſts we were contending with, namely, the Stratonic and Democritic Atheiſts, who would not have

preſſed

preſſed us ſo cloſely: for they admitted Atoms abſolutely indiviſible, whereout the ſouls of men, and all other productions were formed; and held, that theſe Atoms were floating about in infinite ſpace, diſtinct and ſeparate from each other, until by their colliſions, aſſortments, and adheſions, they ranged themſelves into the compound bodies we ſee. Upon this hypotheſis, it is plain there was the ſame number of ſubſtances from all eternity there is now; and upon their cluſtering together, whether by chance or neceſſity, nothing new, unleſs in kind and quality, or eſſence, not in ſubſtance, could be produced. Therefore the ſouls of Men could have no diſtinct exiſtence of their own, nor other than that of the Atoms compoſing them: and upon their diſſolution, not a ſingle Being would be loſt; any more than the King would loſe a ſubject, that is, a palpable ſubſtance, upon diſbanding a regiment.—Nevertheleſs theſe Atoms were a ſufficient foundation for the exiſtence of what they compoſed, their ſubſtance being that of the compounds whereinto they entered. So that our argument, however defective in proving our point to other people, may ſtill remain good *ad hominem*, upon the occaſion whereto we applied it.

Yet we need not want the like foundation without availing ourſelves of the Atheiſt's conceſſion: for after all poſſible diviſion of Matter, it will continue Matter ſtill; nor can you reduce it to nothing by any ſeparation of parts whatever; whence it follows, that there are particles which never were, nor ever will be ſmaller than they are. Theſe then may fairly be ſtiled Atoms actually, if not potentially, indiviſible. Nor is this repugnant to the opinion now generally received among phyſiologiſts, that all Matter is homogeneous; all compound bodies being made up of a *Materia prima*, which is every where one and the ſame in kind and quality, their various eſſences reſulting from the various aſſortments whereinto it is caſt.

If it be ſaid the particles of *Materia prima* muſt have a right ſide and a left, ſeparable, tho' perhaps never actually ſeparated from one another; this is more than we are warranted to aſſert. For the moſt conſiderate perſons have forborn to pronounce peremptorily upon the diviſibility of matter, any further than that it is indefinite, that is, no magnitude can be aſſigned than which we may be aſſured there cannot be a ſmaller. But diviſibility abſolutely infinite, has its difficulties as well as finite:

for

for upon that hypotheſis, half an apple muſt contain as many parts as the whole; for the half containing infinite parts, nothing can be greater than infinite; yet the other half containing the like infinity, to ſay that the addition of them does not encreaſe the number in the whole, ſeems as abſurd as to deny that two and two make four. Since then we have not faculties to determine this point with certainty, the evidence before us of bodies exiſting, and of their having no further exiſtence beyond that of their parts, is a ſtronger proof that a ſtop muſt be put to diviſibility ſomewhere, tho' we cannot tell where, than our want of conception of a particle without ſides is of the contrary. For neither our ſenſes nor imagination can go beyond a certain degree of minuteneſs; how then do we know what we might ſee or apprehend, were they acute enough to diſcern or comprehend objects below that degree.

However this be, it can ſcarce be doubted that the matter, or firſt principle of bodies, has an exiſtence of ſome ſort or other, whether original or derivative, 'tis no matter; and that whatever higher compoſitions are formed thereout, exiſt only in the exiſtence of that; becauſe if the matter of any body were annihilated,

hilated, the exiſtence of that being withdrawn, the body would be no more. Juſt as a Regiment exiſts only by the exiſtence of the men, of whatever kind it be belonging to them, and upon their annihilation could exiſt no more.

But it is alledged, that a Regiment has no Being. Why? Becauſe all compounds, according to us, have no exiſtence at all. Pray when did we ever ſay ſo? Did you never hear of the Welſhman, who riding with a heavy portmanteau before him, and perceiving his horſe tire, took up the portmanteau upon his own ſhoulders to eaſe the beaſt? never conſidering that while the horſe carried him that bore the burthen, he carried that too: and if there had been twenty men hoiſted upon one another, ſo long as the uppermoſt had the portmanteau upon his ſhoulders, the horſe would have carried the ſame weight as if it had lain upon his own back. So while the component parts of bodies exiſt, their exiſtence runs thro' the compoſitions whereinto they enter; and palpable Individuals, together with whatever Companies, Regiments, Corporations, or other Compounds can be formed of them, have as much exiſtence as their primary principles, becauſe they have the very ſame.

There-

Therefore we never denied a Regiment to have exiſtence or Being; but only that it was a Being in the ſingular number, diſtinct from that of the men, and to be added to them.

We conceived it to be like a noun of number, as a Groſs, a Score, a Dozen, which, tho' *entia rationis* in themſelves, yet have a real exiſtence when applied to particular ſubſtances. For a dozen of counters exiſt as really as a ſingle one; if you put the dozen into your pocket, you put in real ſubſtance, not a ſhadow or meer imagination; yet you have not thirteen things there, to wit, twelve counters and the dozen over and above.

You ſay, if a regiment is no Being, neither is man a Being; and this you charge upon us as an egregious overſight. But upon what principles does the conſequence follow? Why, upon thoſe of the Atheiſts we were combating; and was ſo far from being an overſight, that the main ſtreſs of our argument lay in driving our Antagoniſts to the abſurd concluſion of making man to have no Being, no diſtinct exiſtence peculiar to himſelf; nor any thing more than a regiment of atoms, admirably well marſhalled and diſciplined indeed, but ſubſtantially and numerically the ſame they were before enliſting.

Upon

Upon our own principles the concluſion runs the other way : for we argue, that Man muſt be an Individual, not like your palpable Individuals, conſiſting of parts, becauſe he has a Being of his own. And for the truth of our *poſtulatum*, we appeal to every man, Whether he can doubt of his own exiſtence, or that he has a perſonality diſtinct from that of all other Beings.

Nevertheleſs this appeal, it ſeems, cannot avail us ; becauſe, how could any man acquire this ſenſe or knowledge of his perſonality without a human body ? or in other words, how can a man exiſt without a body ? Had we ſaid the mind or ſoul of man might ſo exiſt, it would have been leſs exceptionable ; and yet exceptionable it would have been ; for how could the mind acquire a ſenſe of perſonality without a body ? Now if it be remembered what was the opinion we ſet out to battle againſt in the beginning of my note, namely, that the ſouls of men, as well as all other productions, were formed out of atoms, the correction of Man into Mind might have been ſpared. For when afterwards we ſpoke of the atoms running together to compoſe a human body, we thought that, upon the principles of our adverſaries, Mind and Body muſt be the ſame

thing: but if any one thinks otherwiſe, he is welcome to *dele* Body, and read Mind, Soul or Spirit; our argument will run never the worſe.

As to the queſtion, whether a Man or a Mind can acquire a ſenſe of perſonality without a human body; we apprehend it as difficult for any body to anſwer in the negative, as for us in the affirmative. It may be ſaid indeed, as is ſaid of Mr. *Locke*, that the negative may be very eaſily proved on our own principles: certainly nothing is more eaſy than to aſſert this, and it may paſs with ſuch Readers as will take poſitiveneſs for demonſtration: but it may not be quite ſo eaſy to make out the aſſertion.

But ſuppoſing it certain there can be no knowledge of perſonality without a body, how does it follow that no perſonality or exiſtence can be had without one? or that not having knowledge of exiſtence, and not exiſting, are ſynonimous expreſſions? This is new doctrine to us, and the logic by which it is proved, riſes far above our pitch. It puts us in mind of that uſed in our infancy under the dictates of pure nature, unperverted by education, when the child hides its face in Mamma's apron, and then cries, *Nobody ſees*

me. Which, in the learned language of our Cenſor, would run thus, " In this ſituation I " can acquire no ſenſe or knowledge of any " body's ſeeing me; therefore, or in other " words, nobody does ſee me." Now in our humble apprehenſion, the reality of a fact is not the ſame thing with the evidence of it: the one may be true, tho' the other be wanting. If we have evidence of a thing's exiſting, we may believe it had an exiſtence before we knew it, and may ſtill continue to exiſt after our evidence is withdrawn and loſt out of our memory.

I doubt not Mr. *Monthly* has paſſed many a night in ſound ſleep, ſince he did us the honour to take notice of us; for, conſidering how much more than juſtice he has done our characters in the principal parts of them, he can have had nothing to diſturb his reſt upon that ſcore. Then during all theſe naps, I ſuppoſe he had no ſenſe or knowledge of his own exiſtence: but will he therefore ſay, that he really had no exiſtence? or that every time he fell aſleep, he ceaſed to be, was no Perſon, no Subſtance, no Being? but reſumed all theſe again the moment he awoke in the morning? Therefore upon what grounds can he infer, that when he, and we, and all human

man palpable Individuals ſhall become ſtupified in the ſleep of death, we ſhall utterly loſe our exiſtence, tho' we loſe all evidence of it; and that a new ſet of corporeal organs (if ſuch organs be neceſſary) may not inveſt and awaken us to a new ſcene of evidence?

What ſhall we ſay of the houſes, the trees, the fields we ſee around us? have they a knowledge of their exiſtence? or do they therefore not exiſt at all? To draw this conſequence, muſt drive us plumb into *Berkley*'s ſcheme; that bodies ſubſiſt only in our idea, and are, or ceaſe to be, according as our ideas fluctuate. So that when every body goes out of the room, the tables, the chairs, the pictures, they left behind, become inſtantly annihilated; and upon the company's return, become as inſtantly re-exiſtent.

Notwithſtanding all this, he will not deny that the mind or ſpirit of man may be an individual exiſtence, to be deſtroyed only by the immediate exertion of Omnipotence. Yet in effect he does deny it a few lines below; for he ſays, that by exiſtence, in this caſe, muſt be meant an abſolute and metaphyſical exiſtence; in which ſenſe it is more than probable, there is no other Being in the univerſe but God: for while every thing in nature appears

to be in a conſtant fluctuation and change, it is rational enough to ſuſpect, from analogy, that even the elements of things may be ſo too. Now this reaſoning ſeems to imply, that the ſpirit of man is no more than a fifth element, like that called by *Ariſtotle*, *Entelechia*; for unleſs the mind be included in the elements, the argument from their fluctuation, that there is no created ſubſtance metaphyſically exiſting, would not hold good: or that it is ſomething analogous to the ſpirit of brandy or hartſhorn, a drop of which being put into *Tunbridge* water, takes off the chill it would elſe caſt upon weak ſtomachs; ſo a drop of the ſpirit of man infuſed into his material compoſition, takes off the inſenſibility naturally belonging to it, and renders it capable of ſenſe and underſtanding. Yet it is plain, this drop may be divided into parts, which may one after another enter into the compoſition of the other elements: ſo that what is now ſpirit of man, may by and by become a drop of water, a puff of air, a ſpark of fire, or a ſpeck of earth.

If this be ſo, I ſee no reaſon for calling in Omnipotence to deſtroy the ſpirit of man; for I ſuppoſe there are certain ſtated laws, I muſt not ſay of nature, but, of the univerſe, operating

rating theſe fluctuations and changes of the elements. And that the changes muſt be gradual we may preſume from analogy; for tho' a dead dog may become a tree by being buried under it, it muſt putrify firſt, and be reduced to ſomething which is neither animal nor vegetable ſubſtance, before it can be drawn up by the radical fibres of the tree. So the elements, during their paſſage into one another, muſt be no elements at all, neither earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, nor *entelechia*, and conſequently be non-exiſtent; for palpable exiſtence they have none, and other exiſtence, we are told, belongs not to created things.

The reſult of all this is, that ourſelves, and whatever we ſee or handle, are made up of non-entities, than which nothing can be harder of digeſtion; and if we can pronounce any thing, we may pronounce this abſolutely impoſſible even to Omnipotence. I have heard indeed, that God created all things out of nothing, but I never knew it underſtood thereby, that he employed Nothing as a material whereout to fabricate his worlds; or that he moulded and kneaded up a certain quantity of Nothing, as a baker kneads his dough, until it became Something. I know the Atheiſts, *Lucretius* in particular, charge this idea of

creation

creation upon us, and take great pains to overthrow it; but they fight all the while with a ſhadow; for no Theiſt ever entertained ſuch a notion.

Another reprehenſion given us is for ſaying, that upon diſſolution of the human body, there is not a Being loſt out of Nature; which expreſſion, *Out of Nature*, is, it ſeems, ſuch an egregious impropriety, as to deſerve being ſtigmatized with *Italics*. But we were unwaringly drawn thereinto by the example of other perſons before us: for we have heard of there being a God in Nature—of inviſible Natures, perhaps more elegantly expreſſed by impalpable Natures—of the Nature of virtue, juſtice, government, and many other things which are not objects of phyſiological knowledge. And if we were led to talk like children, by converſing among other children, it had been kind in our Maſter to have inſtructed us how to ſpeak with better propriety: for he might know well enough that our meaning was only to aſſert, that upon certain ſubſtances joining together in a compound, there is not a new Being added to the number upon compoſition, nor is one loſt again out of the whole number upon ſeparation. Now how ought we to have expreſſed ourſelves upon

on this occaſion? In ſhort, it ſeems not very material whether we add *Out of Nature*, or omit it. If a billet be conſumed in the fire, we ſuppoſe the parts of it are diſſipated, but not annihilated: a few of them only remain palpable in the aſhes, but whether the reſt be in nature or out of nature 'tis no matter, ſo they be exiſtent ſomewhere; there will ſtill be the ſame number of parts as before diſunion; and the billet having no exiſtence over and above, or diſtinct from the parts, there will not be a Being loſt upon its conſumption. But we muſt correct our theory againſt another time, and adopt a new article of Faith, to wit, that a compound may conſiſt of parts which had no exiſtence in Nature before they entered into it; and the five elements themſelves, for we muſt reckon the *Entelechia* for one, be made up of a *Materia prima*, every where uniform, and capable of being formed into any of them indifferently, tho' there be no ſuch thing in Nature as a *Materia prima*.

Yet we cannot help ſaying, it was a little ungenerous in Mr. *Monthly* to attack us in flank, while we were engaged with another enemy, againſt whom our diſpoſition was not improperly made: for they being as deficient in phyſiology as ourſelves, would not have de-

nied the exiſtence of atoms in nature; therefore, we ſtill humbly conceive it was with propriety with reſpect to them we urged, that after diſperſion of the atoms, there muſt be as many Beings in nature, as there had been during their coalition in a man. And conſequently, if Man has a Being and Perſonality of his own, diſtinct from all other Beings, and which would be loſt out of Nature upon his annihilation, he cannot be ſuch a compound of atoms.

But having driven them out of the field, and being now to deal with another kind of aſſailant ~~aſſiſtant~~, we may be allowed to change our diſpoſition according to the nature of the attack.—But hold: we ſhall be chid again: for *Attack* is not a phyſiological Being, and there may be great impropriety in applying the term *Nature* to it. Well then, according to the manner of the attack. For atoms, it ſeems, there are none, and the principles of phyſical Beings have no exiſtence in nature, until formed into compounds. Let us try then how we can manage our argument by help of phyſical Beings alone: and in ſo doing, our example of the regiment may ſtill ſerve our purpoſe. For the men are admitted on both ſides to be ſubſtances, whether palpable or metaphyſical, whether indi-

vidual

vidual or compound, 'tis all one; for though we love hair-ſplitting as well as moſt folks, where neceſſary, we ſee no uſe for it here: Subſtances they ſtill are, diſtinct and independent on one another. If then there were ſix hundred of them diſperſed about the country, they did not, upon being incorporated into ten Companies and one Regiment, become ſix hundred and eleven ſubſtances: nor will the King, upon diſbanding them, loſe a ſingle Subject, or Subſtance, or Being, out of his dominion. For ſurely diſbanding is not annihilating, nor can you conceive any Exiſtence or Subſtance belonging to the Regiment annihilated ſo long as the men remain all alive.

Now, to apply this to man: if he be a compound, yet we are not obliged to go ſo far as to the primary principles whereof his elements are conſtituted, for then we ſhall wander out of Nature; but we may diſtribute his whole compoſition into parts ſtill remaining palpable, as his arms, his legs, his heart, his brain; ſuppoſe twenty of them. Theſe twenty parts then are ſo many ſeveral Beings, numerically and ſubſtantially diſtinct from each other in the compoſition; for the leg is not the arm, nor the brain the heart, even in a living man. So that he is nothing more than

a Regiment or collection of theſe twenty parts, having no diſtinct Being of his own which might be added to theirs to make the whole number twenty-one. And if they were ſeparated by diſſection, though they would loſe their vitality, they would not loſe their ſubſtance, but there would ſtill remain twenty ſubſtances, as many as could be counted in the whole compoſition, nor would a ſingle Being be loſt out of Nature.

Therefore if a man, while poſſeſſing his ſenſes and underſtanding, has undoubted evidence of his own exiſtence and perſonality diſtinct from all other Beings, and adds one to the number of thoſe exiſtent, he cannot be a compound or collection of ſubſtances, but an individual, making ſome one particular part of the compoſition whereinto he enters.

This brings us to the examination of what is properly a Man's Self, or that whereto the perſonal pronouns *I*, *You*, *He*, and *She*, may be applied. And here perhaps at firſt there may be thought to be no difficulty; for upon a man coming into the room, my eyes may inform me ſufficiently of his perſon, and I may ſee plainly enough that he is not the table, the chairs, nor the wainſcot ſurrounding him. Very well: let us try then what I can diſcover

by

by my eyes. Why, I ſee a face, a pair of hands, a coat, ſtockings, and ſhoes: are all theſe *You*?——No to be ſure: You know well enough I pull off my coat and ſhoes when I go to bed, and put on banyan and ſlippers in the morning.—— Well, but you don't pull off your hair and nails when you go to bed: then they are parts of *You*.——No, no: they are only excreſcencies; for they have no ſenſe or feeling.——How ſo? If any body was to tear off a parcel of your hair, or one of your nails, ſhould not you feel a grievous ſmart? ——Ay, the pronoun *I* ſhould, becauſe they are faſtened to my fleſh; but the hair and the nails would feel nothing. They are like a packthread wound round my wriſt, which if any one ſhould twitch violently, he would hurt the wriſt, but he would not hurt the packthread,——So then what has ſenſe and feeling only is *Yourſelf*.——Undoubtedly: and every thing that has ſo is a part of *Myſelf*.—— What think you of your teeth, your bones, your fat, the humours in your glands? for alterations may happen in them without your feeling it.——I don't know what to ſay to that: for in common acceptation every thing is reputed *Myſelf* that remains with me after I have pulled off all my cloaths, except the ex-

creſcencies.——Ay, and the excreſcencies too ſometimes: for we often deſcribe a man's perſon by the colour of his hair; and ſhould do by his nails, if they have any thing remarkable or diſtinguiſhing; nay, by his cloaths, if we think he has but one ſuit to wear. So you ſee the term *Self*, like other terms of common acceptation, is fluctuating, determined this way or that by the preſent occaſion: for he that, upon his knife ſlipping while he carves a loin of mutton, is aſked whether he has cut himſelf, may ſay, No, 'tis only a piece of my nail; but if he daſhes the gravy upon his coat, he will be apt to fret at having greaſed himſelf. But what do you take to be truly and properly *Yourſelf?*——I doubt I muſt give up the bones, the fat, and the humours: but ſurely my ſyſtem of nerves, and organs of ſenſe, muſt be *Myſelf*; for the great Mr. *Monthly* pronounces, that without them I could not have knowledge of my perſonality, or, in other words, could not exiſt.——But then it is the nerves and organs jointly that make *Yourſelf*. Your eyes are not *You*, nor your ears, nor your brachial or crural nerves; but the whole compoſition of them altogether is that whereto the pronoun *You* belongs.——So it ſhould ſeem.——Suppoſe an Engliſh ſoldier has loſt a leg in Germany,

many, may he afterwards ſay, I was born in England:——Why not?—Becauſe the palpable compound *born*, to which the pronoun *I* was then applicable, is now no more, being deſtroyed by ſubtraction of the nerves in the leg.——Oh! but it is ſtill a part of the ſame compound.——Remember what you ſaid before, that it was not your eye, nor your ear, but the whole compoſition which was *Yourſelf*.—But it is rational enough to imagine from analogy, that compounds may fluctuate and change into one another, ſo that what was a Self with two legs may become a Self with only one.—May be ſo: but then it is not the ſame Self; for the term *Self* belonging to the whole compoſition, it is plain the preſent compoſition wants a part which was an ingredient helping to complete the former.——You puzzle me now. I wiſh Mr. *Monthly* were here: I warrant he would manage yon with a wet finger. And yet I cannot help thinking the man was the ſame Self after loſing his leg as before, and might apply the pronoun *I* to whatever was done or ſuffered by the two-legged Self.——Take care. For if the Self remains entire after loſs of the leg, then it will follow that the leg, while in vital union with the body, was no conſtituent part of the palpable ſubſtance *I*;

becauſe

becauſe this ſuffers no diminution by the amputation. But we will not preſs this, becauſe you have not your champion by to help you out.

Therefore let us take the compound before fluctuation, while the man has all his limbs and ſenſes entire. In this ſtate I ſuppoſe the whole compoſition, not any part, nor any number of parts leſs than all, is *You*: ſo that what the compoſition does, you do; and, *vice verſa*, whatever is done by you is done by the whole compoſition.——You are right.——Pray do you hear me ſpeak?——Why ſhould you aſk? have not I anſwered you all along?——I am not ſure of that: Something has heard and anſwered me all along very clearly: but I am in ſome doubt whether that was *You*; becauſe it ſeems to me not to have been your whole compoſition. Did your eyes hear any thing of what I ſaid?——They helped to underſtand you, by obſerving your geſtures, and motion of your lips.——Probably they might: But had your noſe or the nerves of your legs or arms any ſhare in the hearing?——There was no occaſion: for I have ears good enough to perform the office of hearing without other aid.——So your ears, or if you pleaſe to add eyes, have performed the whole

office

office of hearing and underſtanding; and I have been talking all this while, not with your whole compoſition, nor with *You*, but with a pair of eyes and ears.——Pſhaw! now you joke with me. And let me tell you, this does not ſit ſo eaſy upon you, nor appear ſo little forced as your argument. Can any body deny that what my ears hear is my hearing?—I deny or affirm nothing; I only aſk, whether what your eyes ſee, and your ears hear, is ſeen and heard by your whole compoſition?——I think it is. I am ſure it is ſeen and heard by *Myſelf*: for I have no notion of one Self to ſee, another to hear, another to ſmell, and ſo on; nor of half Myſelf ſeeing when the other half does not. But to my thinking a perception received at any one part runs through the whole Self, the whole compoſition.——Does it ſo? When you look at a picture, does the ſight of it run down to your great toe? and when ſomebody treads upon your toe, do your eyes inſtantly feel a ſympathetic ſmart?—I am ſure it is the ſame *I*, the ſame *Self*, that ſee the one and feel the other.——Then if you have but one Self to ſerve you upon all occaſions, and this Self cannot perceive by halves, muſt it not be ſomething diſtinct from the nerves and organs, which alternately remain inſenſible of one another's

other's perceptions? And is it not rational enough to ſuſpect, that theſe organs are only channels of conveyance tranſmitting their reſpective notices, as windows tranſmit the light, to the ſame Self, the whole of which perceives every thing that is perceived?——O! for Mr. *Monthly* again, to ſtand by and ſee my head broke! But ſuppoſing it were ſo; may not this *Self* be ſtill a compound?——I am afraid we ſhall hardly be able to make a palpable individual compound of it: ſo we have loſt our exiſtence already; for nothing it ſeems exiſts that is not ſo, nor is there any thing individual unleſs compounds. Nor do I much care: for, ſo we can find pleaſure in one another's company, it is no matter whether we find it with exiſtence or without. But what do you take this compound to be?——Truly, I don't very well know: but ſuppoſe it to lie ſomewhere in the brain. We are told the nerves have been traced to the pineal gland: perhaps there may be a drop of the fifth element; or ſpirit of man, gathered there; and then that is the *Self* whereto the perſonal pronouns belong.——

Do you apprehend yourſelf to be a real Being, or only a dream, a mere fancy or imagination? ——I cannot doubt of my exiſtence, ſo long

as

as I have my ſenſes. —— The having your ſenſes depends upon your having ſenſitive organs, which we have now agreed are no parts of you, therefore are ſeparable from you. But upon ſuch ſeparation ſhould you loſe your Being, becauſe you loſt the knowledge or conſciouſneſs of it? —— No, provided the drop remained entire. —— Suppoſe the drop, without being ever diſſipated, ſhould get into the pineal gland of another human body, ſhould you regain your knowledge and conſciouſneſs? —— I ſhould know I had a Being, but not that I was the ſame Being and Perſon I am now, becauſe probably I might not remember any thing paſſing with me now. —— Well, but tho' you might not know it, ſhould you not really be the ſame Perſon and Being? ——Certainly: for the drop being Me, while that remains the ſame, I muſt be the ſame.—— So the Being and Subſtance of the drop are your Being, which you undoubtedly know you poſſeſs, while you have your ſenſes.——They are——And the materials of the drop are your materials.——Yes.——Do you and the drop make two Beings? —— No: both are one and the ſame. —— So while the whole drop continues to ſubſiſt, you ſubſiſt.——I do.—— But the drop may be divided into two half drops.——Ay, and thoſe again into infinite

parts; for Matter is diviſible *ad infinitum*.—— With all your diviſions, can you ever reduce it to nothing?—— I do not pretend that.—— Is there not the ſame ſubſtance or quantity of matter in the two halves as there was in the whole drop?—— To be ſure.—— And after their being divided into infinite parts, is there not ſtill the ſame quantity among them all?—— I agree it.—— Then none of your ſubſtance being loſt, you ſtill continue to ſubſiſt, notwithſtanding an infinite diſſipation of your parts. —— My Subſtance does; but not Me.—— Why ſo? Are you any thing elſe than the ſubſtance whereof you conſiſt?—— Yes, the union of it into a compound is neceſſary to my ſubſiſtence.—— Is Union a ſubſtance?—— I never ſaid it was.—— Can it make a ſubſtance?—— It may make that to be one which was many before.—— Is that one any addition to the number there was before union, or has it any other exiſtence beſides or over and above theirs?——

It does not to the number of ſubſtances, but it has an exiſtence beſides theirs.—— How do you make that out?—— Becauſe, in common propriety of ſpeech, we apply exiſtence to the compoſition diſtinct from the ſubſtances compounded.— In what inſtances, pray?— Some people deny there is any ſuch thing as a circle exiſting

exiſting in nature; for what appears ſuch, they ſay, is only a Polygon whoſe angles are imperceptible. Now when they ſay this, they do not mean to deny the exiſtence of the bodies ſeeming to be circular: and if they admit the exiſtence of ſquares and triangles, theſe are different ideas from that of the ſubſtances exiſting in them.——Different ideas they may be without being different exiſtencies: for compoſition may ſtill be no more than a particular mode of exiſting in ſubſtances, upon their coming into union from being diſperſed. And it is not neceſſary that upon their being caſt out of a triangle into a ſquare there ſhould be an exiſtence loſt and gained, but only that they change their manner of exiſtence, which whether in ſquare or triangle is ſtill their exiſtence, not that of any thing elſe.——Still, in my apprehenſion, when a thiſtle grows out of the ground, there is a plant in being which was not exiſtent before.——Well, if you make a difficulty, we do not love conteſting where it is needleſs. We will ſuppoſe Compoſition to have an exiſtence diſtinct from the ſubſtances compounded.——Thank ye, for your indulgence. Tho' I am afraid you would not grant it, if you thought it would do me any good.——It could do you no good to deny it. Upon this ſuppoſition there will ariſe a new queſtion, What is pro-

perly You, and your Exiſtence? for you know you have one of ſome ſort or other: whether it be the exiſtence of your compoſition with that of your ſubſtance jointly, or the former alone abſtracted from the latter.——Stay; I muſt think a little: this is not a matter to be determined preſently.——Nay, if you are not clear, never ſtand to puzzle your brains about it. For whichever way we take it, our argument will run the ſame: ſo we will try with the Compoſition, conſidered apart from the materials united by it.—Take your own way, ſince you ſay both will conduct to the ſame point.——Lay down a braſs quadrant upon the table: I ſuppoſe you will allow it has a compoſition exiſting diſtinctly from all other compoſitions.——Very readily.——Place another equal quadrant of ſilver by it. Has not that a compoſition of its own exiſting too?——Certainly.——Does it deſtroy the compoſition of the other?——How can it affect that, only by being laid ſide by ſide by it?——Put two other quadrants of ſteel and copper againſt the former: Have not the four ſo many diſtinct compoſitions exiſting in them?——No doubt they have.——But all together make a compleat circle.——True.——Has not this circle a compoſition too?——Undoubtedly.——Is the com-

poſition of the circle any thing elſe than an aggregate of the four compoſitions in the quadrants?——Nothing elſe, that I know of. ——Now let us return to the human body. Has not your right leg a compoſition of its own diſtinct from that of your left?—— It has. ——And your right arm another?—Yes.—— And your noſe another?——To be ſure.—— And every part of your human frame a ſeparate compoſition of its own.——I cannot deny it.——But we diſcovered before, that the parts I have named were no parts of *Yourſelf*.——We muſt not retract that:—— So your exiſtence lies in the compoſition of the drop or ſpirit of man lodged in your pineal gland.——It does. ——Which drop may be divided into two halves.—— It may.—— And each of theſe halves into three hundred ſubdiviſions.—— Ay, ſo many at leaſt.——And matter being diviſible *ad infinitum*, each of theſe ſubdiviſions are compounds having a compoſition exiſting in them diſtinct from all the reſt.——Admit that they have.——Then is the compoſition of the drop, which is *You*, any thing elſe than the aggregate of the ſix hundred compoſitions in the ſubdiviſions?——It muſt be ſo: *Plato*, thou reaſoneſt well.——So now we are come to the regiment again. This plaguy troubleſome

ſome foe purſues us to whatever quarter we can turn, and drives us to a conceſſion, that we have no better title to exiſtence than itſelf; and it appears in all lights that you have no diſtinct Being of your own, being nothing more than a regiment or collection of infinite ſubſtances or exiſtencies; and upon the diſbanding of them, tho' you ceaſe to be, yet there is not a Being, a Compound, a Compoſition, loſt out of the univerſe.——Yet for all that I cannot help thinking, that upon my ceaſing to be, there muſt be one Being the fewer in the univerſe: ſo I ſhall ſuppoſe, that ſo long as the ſubſtance compoſing me ſubſiſts, however diſperſed or diſſipated, I ſhall ſubſiſt.

But this will avail us little: for bare exiſtence without perception is of no value; and when the particles fall out of their union and intercourſe with one another, they cannot form a perceptive compound.—— That's a great comfort, no doubt. But ſuppoſing any of them could ſee, or hear, or feel, while you ſubſiſt, and they continue to be parts of you, tho' diſperſed to great diſtances; ſhould you be inſenſible of their perceptions?—— Suppoſing that, I muſt be affected with what affects any of them: but this an impoſſible ſuppoſition, becauſe they cannot perceive unleſs

in compoſition. —— But after being decompounded they may come into compoſition again. —— Poſſibly they may. —— The elements perpetually fluctuate and change: ſo what is now ſpirit of man, may become ſpirit of brandy, and in further proceſs of time may become ſpirit of man again, either in one compoſition, or interſperſed among ſeveral drops gathered in ſeveral pineal glands. —— I cannot deny the poſſibility of this. —— Then in this ſtate of compoſition they will all be perceptive, but probably have very different and contrary perceptions; ſome ſeeing while others do not ſee, ſome being in pleaſure while others are in pain. And as you muſt be affected with whatever affects them, you muſt then have theſe contrary perceptions at the ſame time, and enjoy pleaſure while you ſuffer pain. —— I can't tell how to come into this notion tho', that I may ſee and not ſee, be in pleaſure and pain at the ſame inſtant. ——

You know the almighty power of Chance, and how in the courſe of infinite ages ſhe muſt produce all poſſible combinations. Now one poſſible combination is this; that ſome thouſands of years hence half your drop and half mine ſhould join in one pineal gland, and the other halves in ſome other pineal gland.

Will

Will theſe two compounds be Perſons having knowledge of their own exiſtence?——I make no doubt of it.——Will they be diſtinct and different perſons from one another?——Certainly.——Which of them will be one of us?——Neither.——Do not we ſubſiſt ſo long as our ſubſtances ſubſiſt; and ſhall not we perceive whatever they or any parts of them perceive?——We agreed ſo juſt now; not in liking to the hypotheſis, but becauſe drove out of every other.——Shall we have any other ſubſtance, or exiſtence, or perception, than what belongs to thoſe two Perſons?—— And yet I can never bring myſelf to believe that I can become another Perſon, or part of another Perſon, or perceive by his perceptions, much leſs by the perceptions of two.——

So long as you continue alive, I ſuppoſe, you are the ſame Perſon you were ſome years ago. You can agree to this without being drove out of all other hypotheſes.—— Very readily. Nobody can doubt that.——The ſame Being, Exiſtence, or individual Subſtance.—— Certainly. And the ſame individual Compound too.—— Do not the humours of our body continually fluctuate and change, being firſt ſecreted from the blood, then entering into the ſubſtance of our fleſh, and afterwards flying

off

off by perſpiration?—— One cannot be ignorant of this, without great deficiency in phyſiological knowledge.—— Is it not rational enough to ſuſpect from analogy, that the ſpirit of man (if it be a fifth element, or material fluid) fluctuates in like manner; being firſt ſecreted from the animal ſpirits, then turning to the medullary ſubſtance of the brain, and afterwards flying off by perſpiration?—Truly there is a ſhrewd ſuſpicion of ſuch analogy.—And as the particles of this fluid are detached, others flow in to ſupply their places; ſo that there may not be one particle the ſame that was there ſome time ago: but what is now ſpirit of man in you, once was blood, or chyle, or victuals you have eaten, and perhaps a twelvemonth hence may be vapour floating about in the air; yet *You* continuing all the while the ſame ſubſtance and perſon.—I don't know how to diſprove all this.——Then if *You* are a real Being and Subſtance, and are not barely a form or mode of exiſtence in ſomething elſe, and if your Exiſtence and Perſonality remains the ſame throughout all the ſtages of life, from infancy to extreme old age, notwithſtanding all the changes of particles in you drop; may we not argue, as we did before, concerning the nerves and the organs,

that they are no parts of *You*, but channels to convey perception to ſomething elſe, which is numerically and ſubſtantially *Yourſelf?*—— Well, I'll ſay no more, but turn you over to my champion.

Thus which ever way we turn ourſelves, we find nothing but abſurdity and contradiction, ſo long as we place our exiſtence and perſonality in a compound: nor can we eſcape them otherwiſe than by admitting an Individual, not one of your compound individuals, which is none at all except in idea, but an Individual truly ſuch, conſiſting of no parts; that cannot either totally or partially become another ſubſtance, nor can loſe its identity unleſs by annihilation: in which caſe there would be a Being abſolutely loſt out of Nature, that is, out of the number of Beings exiſtent. Into whatever compoſition this Individual enters, we eſteem it *Ourſelves* for the time, notwithſtanding any fluctuation of its parts; provided they fall into the ſame connection, and ſerve the ſame uſes their predeceſſors had done before.

According to the form and texture of theſe compoſitions, we conceive phyſical Beings denominated: ſo we are orthodox in this article of phyſiological faith. But we are reproved

for

for miſapplying the term *Man* to a part of him; becauſe we obſerve, that no man can doubt of his own exiſtence, and a little after place that exiſtence in the mind, which is an individual that can be diveſted of its Being by no power leſs than that which gave it. What then? has not the Man ſuch a Being if his mind has it? May not we ſay a Man has a freſh colour, becauſe he has it only in his cheeks; but none in his arms or his back? So the diſpute turns upon a point of language rather than of phyſiology. For ſurely nobody can underſtand us to imagine that when *Rice* was hanged, he was not diveſted of his Manhood, or did not ceaſe to be a Man. The ſole queſtion is, Whether the term *Man* may, upon any occaſion, be applied to either of his parts after their ſeparation. Suppoſe his body had been hung upon a gibbet in the little green near *Stamford-hill*, if on going along the road in duſk of evening with a friend, as my eyes are not very good, I ſhould aſk, Pray what is that ſticks up in the middle of the common? Is it a tree? And he ſhould anſwer, No: it is a Man hanging in chains. Would he be guilty of falſe language in his anſwer? Or ſuppoſe I aſk *Whitefield* what he thinks is become of him: and he tells me, "Such a wicked Man,

" not having received abſolution from me, to " be ſure is gone to the Devil." Muſt we call this an impropriety of expreſſion, meerly becauſe we are pretty ſure the Devil has not got both parts of the palpable Individual yet?

With regard to Agency, we hold as appears by Note (b) on page 31, that in every human action the mind acts upon ſome corporeal organ or inſtrument, and having many of them under command, ſhe can by employing them reſpectively affect things external, as when we take up a book; or the body, as when we wipe our face; or herſelf, as when we recollect ſome paſt occurrence. All which actions are ordinarily aſcribed to the Man: for we ſay the Man thinks, the Man wipes his face, or the Man takes up a book. But if the term *Man* belongs only to the palpable compound, it muſt include the whole of it, and cannot be applied to the mind even together with ſome of the limbs and organs excluſive of the reſt: ſo that the Man neither walks, nor writes, becauſe in the former his hands perhaps hang dangling by his ſide; in the latter, his legs, like a couple of lazy curs, ſit doing nothing under the table. If we are to be held to this rigorous phyſiological dialect, perhaps no Man ever did a ſingle thing in all

his

his life; becauſe it would be difficult to aſſign any action whereto ſome parts of his compoſition were not wholly uſeleſs and unconcurrent.

As to the adverb *alternately*, I don't recollect where we have employed it: but if we have, I ſee no great harm done. Poſſibly Mr. *Monthly* takes a pipe ſometimes, while ſitting, like Fate, over the new-born babes of literature, to ſpin their future fortunes in the temple of fame. He whiffs and thinks, and thinks and whiffs again. In this caſe, might not we ſay the Man acts alternately. Sometimes upon his mouth to draw ſmoke into it, and ſometimes upon his *Pericranium* to raiſe ideas there, now and then a little ſmoky too? or ſhould we ſay the mind acts upon the pectoral and guttural muſcles, they act upon the fuming weed in the tube, the exudations of that ſtimulate the ſenſory nerves in his palate, theſe communicate their motion to the brain, which acts upon the mind again, by raiſing up judicious obſervations for her to contemplate? Would this learned ſtile tend more to the entertainment and edification of our readers?

If our language, in all theſe particulars, has been incorrect, it will be good-natured in him

to

to ſet us right. In the mean time, as a man that makes aukward bows muſt go on with his aukwardneſs until his dancing-maſter can teach him to perform more genteely; ſo we may hope for indulgence in our vulgarity of expreſſion, until our Maſter ſhall inſtruct us to deliver ourſelves with better grace and elegance.

We have ſpent many more words in our defence than were employed in the attack: but it is always the caſe, that leſs trouble is requiſite to puzzle a cauſe than to clear it up, and a man may make more tangles in a fine ſkain of thread in a minute, than he can undo again in an hour. We did not undertake it for the ſake of our own credit, which has been much more raiſed than depreſſed by the labours of our good couſin Mr. *Monthly Comment*, who has ſaid ſo many handſome things of us, that it would be vanity to repeat them; and a few freedoms ought not to be taken amiſs, as they ſhow an impartiality, that adds weight to what has been ſaid in our favour. It is common to ſee two council fight like dog and bear at the bar, without thinking the worſe of one another all the while; their ſtrenuouſneſs encourages clients. So our making a little noiſe with one another may turn to mutual

tual account; it may ſerve, like the market-bell, to awaken the curioſity of cuſtomers, and quicken the ſale of both our wares. This benefit, if it accrues, we ſhall be heartily glad of, in gratitude for the high encomiums beſtowed on us; yet we own it will be purely accidental: for what raiſed our ſollicitude, was the doctrine advanced, of the mind and material elements fluctuating and changing into one another; which ſeemed a revival, tho' we are willing to believe it was not intended as ſuch, of the old atheiſtical notion, that a perceptive and active Being might be formed of inert and ſenſeleſs principles. This ſeemed a matter of importance to us, well deſerving our ſerious care and endeavours to prevent; and engaged us to a replication, which upon all other accounts we ſhould have judged needleſs.

FINIS.